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RECENT CASES.
BANKRUPTCY-CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION-AMENDMENT OF 1903--CoR-
PORATIoN SINGER v. NAT. BEDSTEAD MFG. Co., ii AM. B. R. 276 (N. J. CH.)-
Held, that while it is doubtful whether, according to the amendment of 1903
to the Bankruptcy Act, the appointment of a receiver of a corporation by a
State court under a State insolvency law is superseded by the selection of a
trustee by a Federal court in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, the State
court, by comity, would discharge its own receiver in favor of the Federal
trustee without attempting a construction of the amendment.
This case presents a vexatious question of a conflict of jurisdiction between
the State and Federal courts. The difficulty rises directly out of the amend-
ment to Sec. 4b of the Bankruptcy Act, making a receivership of a corporation,
because of insolvency, an act of bankruptcy. I re Watts, 23 Sup. Ct. 718,
which is the only case yet reported touching this question, was a contempt
proceeding involving an ugly clash of jurisdiction between a Circuit Court of
Indiana and a Federal District Court. The question in the instant case was
only alluded to in a dictum by Fuller, C. J., but sufficiently to show that the
Supreme Court will consider State receiverships as superseded by subsequent
bankruptcy proceedings in a Federal court. But the result of the decision
in that case was virtually a rebuke to the Federal court for attempting to
enforce this very thing. A similar warning to Federal courts to refrain
from summary measures when a conflict of jurisdiction is involved in con-
struing this amendment may be derived from the holding in Jaquith v. Row-
ley, 188 U. S. 620. As the law now stands a corporation cannot go into
voluntary bankruptcy. Its only relief is to petition a State court for the
appointment of a receiver in insolvency, who takes charge of the property.
By the amendment of i9o3, this appointment is, ipso facto, an act of bank-
ruptcy, giving the trustee in bankruptcy exclusive control of the same prop-
erty. Thus the very act of a State court appointing a receiver in insolvency,
proprio vigore, terminates that receivership by throwing the whole estate
into bankruptcy. As no provision existed in any previous bankruptcy act
similar to this amendment, it is impossible to reason by analogy as to the
rule of law to. be applied. The only proper solution of the difficulty would
seem to be the repeal of the bungling amendment. Until this can be done
serious friction will only be prevented by comity. Carling v. Seymour Lum-
ber Co., 113 Fed. 483.
BANKRUPTCY-INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDING-JURY TRIAL-LIMITING ISSUES.
-MoRss v. FRANKLIN Co. Co., ii AM. B. R. 423.-Held, that upon a jury
trial duly demanded by the alleged bankrupt, the issues to be determined by
the jury are limited to (i) the question of insolvency, and "(2) the act ;f
bankruptcy, charged in the petition, and where the answer alleges that the
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petitioners are not entitled to maintain the proceedings, not being in fact
creditors, a motion to limit the issues to the first two questions, excluding
from the jury the question of the right of the petitioners to maintain the
suit, will be granted.
Section iga of the Bankruptcy Act specifies the above two issues which
an alleged bankrupt may require to be submitted to a jury. The gist of this
case is whether, under Const. U. S., Amend. 7, a defendant has an absolute
right to have submitted to a jury the question whether the petitioners are
qualified to maintain the suit. It is well settled that this amendment applies
only to courts of law and that there is no absolute right to a trial by jury
in a court of equity. McClave v. Gibb, 157 N. Y. 413. As bankruptcy is
essentially a division of equity, In re Anderson, 23 Fed. 482, it is reasonable
that this rule of equity is alike applicable in bankruptcy. In re Christenson,
ioi Fed. 243; Simonson v. Sinshiener, ioo Fed. 426. This reasoning is sup-
ported in Barton v. Barbour, io4 U. S. io6, in construing a provision in a
former act very similar to the section of the present statute here involved.
.Act of 1867, Sec. 41; Bill, Assn. v. Beckwith, Fed. Cas. 1,4o6. The principal
case, in holding that a demand for a trial by jury can be had in bankruptcy
in only the two cases specified in the statute, seems in consonance with the
few decisions that have been rendered directly on the subject, but is treated
as questionable in Brandenburg on Bankruptcy (3d ed.), Secs. 508-511.
BANKRuPTcy-JuRIsDIcTIoN-ExEMPT PROPERTY-PROSECUTION OF ACTION
IN STATE CouRT.-IN RE RIcHAmsoN, II AM. B. R. 379.-A creditor, holding
a note against property of a bankrupt in which right of redemption has been
waived, petitioned for stay of bankruptcy proceedings while he sued in a
State court for a lien upon the exempt property. Held, that a court of bank-
ruptcy has jurisdiction over such claims and can afford relief equivalent to
that of a State court, hence the petition should be denied.
Doubt as to what the real law is on the question of jurisdiction involved
in this case led the referee to announce this decision avowedly "with much
difference." Since the title of the exempt property does not vest in the
trustee, as does that of the unexempt property, Bankruptcy Act of I898, Sec.
7oa, it is only reasonable that claims against such property should never
come within the jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy. The decision to the
contrary in the present case is sustained, to a degree, by In re Tune, 115 Fed.
9o6, and by a dictum of Shiras, J., in In re Little, iio Fed. 661. But the pre-
ponderant authority is unquestionably against this holding, denying the
jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy to adjudicate claims against exemptions.
In re Bass, Fed. Cas. 1,891; In re Camp, 91 Fed. 745; Sellers v. Bell, 94 Fed.
8oi; In re Hill, )6 Fed. 185; It re Black, 1O4 Fed. 289; In re Swords, 112 Fed.
661. The present decision is therefore grounded on very poor authority.
See Collier on Bankruptcy (4th ed.), 78-81; Bardes v. Bank, 178 U. S. 524.
CARRIERS-ILLEGAL COMBINATIONS-UNJUST DISCRIMINATION.-KELLOGG
v. SOwERBY, 87 N. Y. SuPP. 412.-Owners of elevators formed an association,
which contracted with railroad companies to receive a fixed price per bushel
for all grain handled at a certain point, whether by themselves or by outside
companies. In pursuance of this agreement, the railroads refused to deliver
grain to the plaintiff, who had not joined the association, except on the pay-
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ment by the shipper of an additional charge, thus ruining plaintiff's business.
Held, that the association and railroads were liable for damages sustained by-
plaintiff.
The discrimination against the plaintiff was unlawful, and as the asso-
ciation was a party to the illegal agreement, their liability is co-extensive
with that of the railroads. It is a well established principle of law that a
common carrier cannot make unjust discriminations either in granting car-
riage or in carrying for some at a less rate than for others. McDuffee v.
Ry. Co., 52 N. H. 430; R. R. Co. v. Rinard, 46 Ind. 293; R. R. Co. v. Ervin,
ii8 Ill. 25o. But in many instances a discrimination has been sustained or the
ground that it was not unreasonable. Johnson v. R. R. Co., i6 Fla. 623; R. R..
Co. v. People, 67 Ill. ii. But a railway company cannot charge one rate
for delivering grain at a particular elevator in a city, and a higher rate for
delivering at another elevator in the same city, and equally accessible.
Vincent v. Ry. Co., 49 Ill. 33. At common law a carrier is not bound to
treat all with absolute equality. Ry. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray 393; Sargent v. R.
R. Co., 115 Mass. 422; Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed. 529; and it has been held
that a company may discriminate in favor of persons shipping large quantities
of freight. R. R. Co. v. Forsaith, 59 N. H. 122; Nicholson v. Ry Co., i Nev.
& Macn. i2i; contra, Scofield v. Ry. Co., 43 Ohio St. 571.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN-FIsHING RIGHTs.-ALBRIGHT
v. PARK ComMissION, 57 AT 398 (N. J.).-A statute providing that the
right to take fish from inland lakes be acquired by eminent domain for public
enjoyment, held, unconstitutional, such right not being one of use, but of
mere pastime. Gummere, C. J., and Vroom, J., dissenting.
In this case the decision rests on the distinction between the right to.
acquire property for park purposes, which the State has, Shoemaker v. U. S.,.
147 U. S. 282, for the benefit of the public at large, and the acquisition of
property by the State for a limited benefit to a small number of people. It
is usually considered a question for the legislature to determine whether the
public benefit is sufficiently great to justify the exercise of eminent domain,
Water Co. v. Stanley, 39 Hun. 428; Com. v. Breed, 4 Pick. 463; State v
Morris Aque. Co., 46 N. J. L 495, though the courts will always rectify a
gross abuse of this power. Buckingham v. Smith, IO Ohio 288; Coster v.
Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 64. And they will look with particular care that
the use to which the property is to be put, be public, especially in the case of
real property, Heyward v. New York, 8 Barb. 488; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill
i49. Being a grant by the government, it would be repugnant to the Con-
stitution for the State to violate a contract for other than public purposes.
CONSTITUTIoNIAL LAw-ExPoRTs-TAxATION.-CORNELL V. COYNE, 24 Sup.
CT. 383.-Held, that the same tax on cheese manufactured solely for exporting-
as is laid on other cheese, is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision for-
bidding a tax on exports. Fuller, C. J., and Harlan, J., dissenting.
In the dissenting opinion it is contended that as soon as an article is
set aside for .the purpose of exporting, it becomes an export within the mean-
ing of the Constitution; that otherwise there is no way of preventing Congress
from evading the Constitution by taxihg exports before they are shipped.
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This contention, however, is not supported by authority. The goods must
be actually in process of transportation by the carrier before they become
exports. Coe v. Errol, I6 U. S. 577; Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Wood. 408. In
Clark v. Monroe, 6o Ga. 61, property was held to be exports, but there it was
actually on board the carrier. The test is not whether the goods taxed are
to be exported later, but whether they are taxed because they are going to
be exported. Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 5o4. Goods still in the factory,
though finished and ready for shipping, are a part of the general mass of
taxable property and do not come under the head of exports. Brown v.
HFlouston, 114 U. S. 622; Myers v. Co. Commissioners, 83 Md. 385; Nelson
Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 22 Fed. 54.
CONTRACTs-GooDs TO 3E MANUFACTURED-SALE BY SAMPLE.-IDEAL
WRENCH Co. v. GARViN MACHINE Co., 87 N. Y. SUPP. 41.-The defendant
contracted to manufacture a quantity of wrenches, equal in every respect to
sample. The purchase price was paid and the goods were delivered and
accepted. The wrenches proved to be defective, and were valueless for
plaintiff's purposes. Held, that, as the contract was to manufacture and
deliver and not a sale by sample, the acceptance of the goods precluded a
recovery for damages sustained. Laughlin and Hatch, JJ., dissenting.
The decision is based upon the hypothesis that to constitute a sale by
sample the goods must be in esse at the time of sale, a conclusion analogous
to the New York doctrine relative to the statute of frauds. When the con-
tract is to manufacture and deliver, as distinguished from a sale by sample,
the court adopts the theory that an acceptance of the goods, with opportunity
to examine, precludes a recovery for any defects that may exist, the docrine
of caveat emptor governing. Iron Co. v. Pope, io8 N. Y. 232. In a sale
by sample, however, there is a warranty surviving acceptance that the goods
will substantially conform with the sample, the buyer having the privilege of
rejecting them, or accepting and suing for damages. Zabriski v. R. R. Co.,
131 N. Y. 72; Day v. Pool, 52 N. Y. 416; Leitch v. Manufacturing Co., 64
Minn. 434. This latter proposition, however, in Briggs v. Hilton, 99 N. Y.
517, was applied to an executory contract to manufacture, the court deciding
that the existence of the goods was immaterial; and the recent case of Henry
v. Talcott, 175 N. Y. 385, negatives the presumption that the goods must be
in esse to constitute a sale by sample, holding that the question is one of fact
for the jury. In elucidating their position as to the statute of frauds, the
New York courts have freely acknowledged that it is continued "at the
expense of sound principle," Cooke v. Millard, 65 N. Y. 352; and to extend
the doctrine to questions outside of its original application would seem
anomalous. In view of the prevalent custom of manufacturers to exhibit
samples, contracting to manufacture goods in conformity thereto, and con-
sidering the underlying reason for exempting sales by samples from the
doctrine of caveat emptor, it would appear that the application of the rule
should not be made dependent upon the existence or non-existence of the
subject matter at the time the agreement is made.
CoRPoRATIoNs-FmucIARY RELATION OF PROIOTERS--RxECOVERY OF SECRET
PaoFrrs BY SToCKHOLDRS.-HUTcHiNSoN V. SImPsoN, 87 N. Y. SuPP. 369.-
The promoters of a corporation to control malting establishments on which
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they held options issued subscription blanks, addressed to themselves, con-
taining representations that the capital would be used for specified purposes.
A large block of stock remained after the projects enumerated in the contract
were consummated, and this they secretly appropriated. Held, that an action
could not be maintained by stockholders to compel the promoters to account
to the corporation for the stock taken. Hatch and Laughlin, JJ., dissenting.
A promoter occupies a fiduciary relation towards the corporation and
stockholders, and if he retains secret profits, he is liable to account therefor.
Dickerman v. Trust Co., 176 U. S. x81; Brewster v. Hatch, 122 N. Y. 349;
Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310; Glucksfein v. Barnes (igoo) App. Cas.
310; and it is not necessary to show a fraudulent intent-it is sufficient that
the profits were made secretly. Land Co. v. Loudenmlager, 55 N. J. Eq. 78;
Nitrate Co. v. Syndicate (1899), 2 Ch. 392. But the liability of a promoter
is predicaied upon a violation of the trust relation, and the decision in the
principal case is based upon the assumption that the contract was a private
one between the signers of the subscription blanks and the promoters, the
latter not occupying a fiduciary position towards the corporation. The dis-
tinction is a doubtful one, as the acts of the promoters were impliedly ratified
by the company, the promoters themselves assuming the management of the
same. Where a director sells property to the corporation at an excessive
valuation, the company alone can take advantage thereof, a stockholder having
no remedy. Burland v. Earle (i9o2) App. Cas. 83; but when the corporation
is in control of the promoters, and the officers refuse to act, a suit by the
stockholders will be sustained. Flynn v. R. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 493; Hawes v.
Oakland, 1o4 U. S. 450. Where there was a sale to the corporation by the
promoters, the sale was rescinded, but it was held that equity would not
compel the promoters to account for the profits. Erlanger v. Phosphate Co.,
3 App. Cas. 1219; but where new equities have arisen, the remedy is not a
rescission of the contract, but an action for accounting. Yale Stove Co. v.
Wilcox, 64 Conn. ioi; In re Olympic, 2 Ch. 153. Undoubtedly the stock-
holders have a remedy in the nature of an action. of deceit against the pro-
moters. Brewster v. Hatch, supra.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL AcT-SuRvvAL. OF TORT ACTIoN-CONFLICT OF
LAwS.-SMITH V. EMPIa STATE-IDAHO M. & D. Co., 127 FED. 462 (C. C.).-
Held, that an action to recover damages against a master for the death of a
servant while in the course of his employment by the master's alleged negli-
gence is a transitory action to enforce a personal liability, which may be
litigated in a State other than that in which the accident occurred.
The reasoning of this case seems to illustrate the trend of the law
toward recognizing the transitory nature of such actions as a matter of
right rather than of mere comity. Early cases in this country held that in
absence of proof as to statutes of the State where the death occurred the
common law will be presumed to be there in force, and other States will not
apply their bwn statutory remedies to cases arising outside their own borders.
C. & W. I. Ry. Co. v. Schroeder, 18 Ill. App. 328. So no remedy lay in
Maryland for such death in Pennsylvania, the remedy being local and having
no force nor vigor outside the State where the statute was made. State v:
Pittburgh & C. Ry. Co., 45 Md. 41. On the other hand, while the foreign
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statute has no extraterritorial force, rights under it, not contrary to the policy
of Pennsylvania, will, by comity, be enforced by remedies according to Penn-
sylvania procedure. Knight v. W. . Ry. Co., io8 Pa. St. 25o. And although
at common law such actions abate upon the death of the person injured, yet
where the statute of the State in which the injury was inflicted gives a right
of action to the personal representatives of the deceased, that right may be
enforced in another State having a similar statute. Burns v. Grand Rapids
& I. R. Co., i3 Ind. i69; 15 N. E. 23o.
EMINENT DOMAiN-PRCEEDINGS BY THE UNITED STATES-DIsMIssAL-
DAMAGES.-UNITED STATES V. DicKsoN, 127 FED. 774 (C. C..-Held, that
proceedings by the United States to condemn land for a public building or
other governmental purpose may be dismissed at any time before the actual
acceptance of the property and payment therefor, until which time there is
no "taking" of the property, and the United States is not subject to the
payment of costs or damages to the landowners on such dismissal.
Such costs and damages seem to have no existence independently of
statutory enactments. Thus a municipal corporation which institutes con-
demnation proceedings against certain land, and abandons them six months
later, is not liable for damages to the rental of the land caused by such delay,
in the absence of any showing that the delay was unnecessary, or that there
was malice or want of probable cause. Feiten v. City of Milwaukee, 47 Wis.
494; 2 N. W. 1148. So where a city proceeds under an ordinance to widen
a street, and thereafter takes no steps in the premises, and an abutting owner,
learning of the passage of the ordinances, tears away all the front of a
building in front of his lot and rebuilds such front four feet further back, he
cannot recover for the expense incurred from the city. Whyte v. City of
Kansas, 23 Mo. App. 4o9. And where a railroad company dismisses an appeal
in condemnation proceedings against the protest of the appellee, in the
absence of a special contract or positive rule of law, there can be no recovery
against the railroad company for services, time, or expenses incurred in
defending against such condemnation proceedings. Bergmann v. St. P., S.
& T. F. Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 533.
EQUITY-STREET IMPROVEMENT-SETTING AsIDE ASSESSMENT-FARR V.
CITY oF DETRoIT, 99 N. W. 19 (MIc,.).-A city council paved a street in
accordance with a petition which did not have enough signers to give the
council jurisdiction. Held, that a property owner on the street cannot main-
tain an action in equity, after the work is completed, to have his assessment
set aside. Grant, J., dissenting.
As a general rule assessments made without all the requisites of juris-
diction can be restrained, Zeigler v. Hopkins, 117 U. S. 683; Dillon's Munie.
Corps, Sec. 400, Vol. 2. But a party may so act as to be estopped to deny
the authority of the city officials. Goodwillie v. City of Manistee, 93 Mich.
17o. As to what constitutes an estoppel, in such cases, however, there is a
conflict. Some decisions hold that if the property owner simply knows that
the work is going on he is estopped. People v. City of Rochester, 21 Barb.
656; Fitzhugh v. Bay City, io9 Mich. 581. Others, that he is not obliged to
take any action till his rights are called in question. Mulligan v. Smith, 59
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Cal. 2o6; Whitney v. Port Huron, 88 Mich. 268. From these citations it
appears that even in Michigan, where the present case was decided, the de-
cisions are not harmonious. The rule held generally is, contrary to the
decision in the present case, that mere inaction will not estop the complainant
from contesting the jurisdiction of the officials. Ogden City v. Armstrong,
168 U. S. 224; Canfield v. Smith, 34 Wis. 381.
EVIDENCE-ADMISS IB LiTY-DANGEROUS PaEISES.-PoTrTr v. CAvE, 98
N. W. 569 (IA.).-In an action for injuries sustained by falling down an
unguarded stairway, plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence of previous
accidents on the stairway and of warnings to the defendant that it was dan-
gerous. Held, that it was properly excluded.
Following previous decisions in the same court, Hudson v. R. R., 59
Ia. 581; Croddy v. R. R., 9i Ia. 605. But the court has intimated its
disapproval of this view. Mathews v. Cedar Rapids, 8o Ia. 466. The
leading case in support is, Collins v. Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396;
Hubbard z. R. R., 39 Me. 5o8. The objection to the evidence is based on the
fact that its introduction tends to divert the attention of the jury from the
real question in dispute by raising a collateral issue. The better rule, how-
ever, seems to be that such evidence is admissible. The character of the place
being in issue the defendant should be prepared to show its real character
in the face of any proof bearing on the subject. Columbia v. Armes, IO7 U.
S. 519; Quinlan v. Utica, 74 N. Y. 6o3; Chicago- v. Powers. 42 Ill. i6g. As
tending to support the principal decision, in a number of cases evidence that
persons had escaped injury was excluded. Aldrich v. Pelham, x Gray 51o;
Ass'n. v. Giles, 33 N. J. L. 263. But in the latter case the court said that the
matter rested in the discretion of the court; it being often better to admit such
evidence. As illustrating a case where this kind of evidence was properly
admitted see Calkins v. Hartford, 33 Conn. 57. But this latter class of evi-
dence, viz.: that other persons escaped injury, is not so convincing as evidence
that others were injured, since persons are not wont to seek such places and
do not willingly fall into them. Columbia v. Armes, supra.
LEASE-COVENANTS AND WARRANTIES-QUIET ENJOYMENT-EMINENT
DOMAIN.-PABST BREWING Co. v. THoREY, 127 FED. 439 (C. C. A.).-Where
a lessor covenanted to secure the lessee in the quiet enjoyment of the premises
against acts of the lessor, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, "or
any other persons," held, that the words "or any other persons," being read by
the rule ejusdem generis, do not warrant against the exercise by the govern-
ment of its power of eminent domain.
All contracts are inherently subject to the paramount power of the
sovereign, and the exercise of such power is never understood to involve
their violation. The power acts upon the property which is the subject of
the confract, and not upon the contract itself. Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall.
655. Eminent domain is the right of the sovereign, without the consent of the
owner, when necessary, to make private property subservient to the public
welfare, and hence does not involve paramount ownership in the State. Giesy
v. Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 3o8. Even the act of a de faclo
sovereign is outside the scope of the covenant. If the sovereignty be eventu-
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ally recognized as de jure also, the act is an act of sovereignty and lawful;
otherwise it is merely tortious. Dudley v. Folliott, 3 T. R. 584; Watkeys v.
De Lancey, 4 Doug. 354, 26 E. C. L. 400. A covenant for quiet enjoyment in
a lease only goes to the extent of engaging that the landlord has a good title
and can give a free and unencumbered lease. RanZway v. Wilkie, 13 N. Y.
Supp. 554. But the covenant for quiet enjoyment is broken where the land
at the time of the lease was subject to a lien for street betterments, unless the
lessor remove the lien. Blackie v. Hudson, 117 Mass. I81.
NEGLIGENcE-FREE PASS-ExEmPTION" FROm LABILITY.-NoRTH. PAc. Ry.
Co. v. ADAMS, 24 SuP. CT. 4o.-Held, that a railway company can exempt
itself from liability for injury through negligence to one travelling on a free
pass. Harlan and McKenna, JJ., dissenting.
The decisions on this subject are various and conflicting. In England
there can be a general exemption for liability even in case of a passenger
for hire. Slims v. Great Northern R. Co., 14 C. B. 647; Peek v. R. Co., io
H. L Cas. 473. In this country some cases are to the effect that the company
is liable for negligence to all its passengers, free or otherwise. Penn. R. Co.
v. Butler, 57 Pa. St. 335; Mobile & 0. R. CO., 41 Ala. 486. In New York
there can be a limitation of liability for negligence of servants; not for party's
own negligence. Stinson v. N. Y. Central, 32 N. Y. 333. In Illinois there is
a distinction between gross and ordinary negligence. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Chapman, 133 Ill. 96. The general rule is that it is not just and reasonable
on grounds of public policy that carriers should limit their liability for negli-
gence in case of passengers for hire. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, 126
Ind. 176; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 73 Fed. 519. The leading
case on this point in the Federal courts is R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357.
But as regards free passengers a limitation of liability violates no rule of
public policy and is valid. Quimby v. Boston, etc., R. Co., i5o Mass. 365;
Griswold v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 53 Conn. 371. This rule as to free passengers
formerly unsettled in the United States courts, may, by the present decision,
be considered as established.
NoTEs-GuARANToR-NoTIcE OF NoN-PAYmENT-EFFECT OF FAILURE TO
GivE.-PFAELzER v. KAU, 69 N. E. 914 (ILu.).-Held, that a guarantor of a
note is not entitled to notice of non-payment even though he can show that
he has sustained losses which would not have occurred if notice had been
given to him.
There is no unanimity among the authorities on this point, some holding
that reasonable notice of non-payment should be given. Talbot v. Gray, 18
Pick. 534; Gamage v. Hutchins, 23 Me. 565; Gibbs v. Cannon, 9 Serg. & P
198. The weight of authority maintains that the guarantor cannot set up
wantof notice as a defense. Beebe v. Dudley, 6 Foster 249; Allen v. Right-
mere, 20 Johns. 365. The Illinois decisions are in conflict. In Heaton v.
Hulbert, 3 Scam. 489, it was held that notice must be given if through the
lack of it the guarantor suffers. Voltz v. Harfis, 40 Ill. 155. The later cases
seem to uphold the principal case. Gage v. Mechanics Nat. Bank, 79 Ill. 62;
Parkhurst v. Vail, 73 Ill. 343; Stowell v. Raymond, 83 Ill. I2o.
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PEONAGE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE.--U S. v. MCCLELLAN, 127
FEa. 971 (GA.).-A conviction, in accordance with the statute against peon-
age, of one who holds another in involuntary servitude to work out a debt,
held, valid.
The constitutionality of the statute is plain under Const. U. S., Amend.
13, Secs. i and 2, since it is merely a prohibition of involuntary servitude.
Although the statute in question was enacted to prohibit peonage in New
•Mexico, it is proper for the law to be applied to any of the States as well.
Prgg v. Penn., i6 Pet. 539. In the principal case the question of the some-
what conflicting doctrines of the necessity of a strict application of the
Penal Statutes, and the broad construction with which the statutes guarding
the liberty of the citizen should be viewed, arises. Following the Peonage
Cases, 123 Fed. 671, it holds that the latter doctrine demands the greater
protection. On the whole, it seems rather incongruous that the question of
negro slavery should still appear in the Federal courts. (See editorial com-
ment)
RAILRoADs-CRossING AccimNT-IMPuTABLm NEGLIGENCL.-DUVAL v.
RAILROAD, 46 S. E. 750 (N. C.).-Held, that negligence of one with whom
plaintiff was riding as a guest in a carriage struck by defendant's train, is not
imputable to plaintiff.
In Thlorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 11S, it was held that the negligence of a
driver was imputable to one riding in the conveyance with him. This case
was expressly overruled in The Bernina, 13 App. Cas. i, in which Lord
Herschell cites with approval Little v. Hackett, ii6 U. S. 336. In Prideaux
v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513, the English doctrine as pro-
mulgated in Thorogood v. Bryan, supra, was approved and adopted. See
also Otis v. Town of Jonesville, 47 Wis. 422; Whittaker v. Helena, 14 Mont.
124; Railroad v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627. But by the great weight of authority
in this country and in England, the doctrine set forth in the decision in the
principal case is the correct one. Railroad v. Lapsley, 51 Fed. 174; Little v.
Hackett, supra; City of Coruna v. Ervin, 59 Ill. App. 555; Knapp v. Dogg,
18 How. Prac. i65. It has been held that the rule that the driver's negligence
should not be imputed to the plaintiff should apply only in cases where the
plaintiff is seated away from the driver or is separated from him by an
inclosure and is without opportunity to discover danger. Robinson v. Rail-
road, 66 N. Y. ii; Brickell v. Railroad, i2o N. Y. 290.
TELEGAM-FAiLuxa To DELIVER-DAmAGES.-WEsTERN UNION TEL. Co.
v. McNAmY, 78 S. W. 969 (TEx.).-The delivery of a telekram notifying
plaintiff of her brother's death and requesting instructions was negligently
delayed. Held, that damages for mental anguish are not recoverable, although
the nature and importance of the message are apparent on its face.
This is the first break in the long line of decisions of this court, which
have established the so-called "Texas Doctrine," namely, that where the
importance of the message is apparent, damages for mental anguish are re-
coverable. Tel. Co. v. Simpson, 73 Tex. 422; Tel. Co. v. Kerr, 4 Tex. Cir.
App. 28o; Tel. Co. v. Proctor, 6 Tex. Cir. App. 3oo. The trend of the later
decisions is to repudiate that doctrine. Sparkman v. Tel. Co., 41 S. E.
(N. C.) 881; XII Yale Law Journal, IIi, in which the authorities are care-
fully marshalled.
